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During the first week of December, the U.S. President hosted the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace agreement. His pledge was an end to decades of conflict in the unstable eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Shortly after, however, a sharply contrasting strategy for instability emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, hitting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President warned, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Change of Direction

This contrast highlights the central principle of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on commerce and conflict resolution—even as this fits with the nascent air campaign in Nigeria is an open question.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. state department official on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative stated this, noting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This change is major, but observers caution it is premature to gauge its impact. The approach is complicated by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained an analyst for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research estimates this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Geopolitical Disinterest and Strains

Unlike his recent predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable engagement with African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later admitted using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant disagreement has developed with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Diplomacy and Conditional Intervention

A similar tension appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the harsh rhetoric may have spurred the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

Similar to Other Powers

Observers characterize the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the new approach likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” she added.